



# Niger Delta Dialogue

NOVEMBER 2ND - 3RD 2016

**“PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTY PROGRAM: SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES  
LESSONS LEARNED FOR FEDERAL AND STATE PROGRAMMES”**



Academic Associates PeaceWorks

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LESSONS LEARNED FOR FEDERAL AND STATE PROGRAMMES”**

**ACADEMIC ASSOCIATES PEACEWORKS  
WITH SUPPORT FROM**

**EUROPEAN UNION  
&  
NIGERIA STABILITY RECONCILIATION PROGRAMME**



## INTRODUCTION



*Cross Section of Participants*

**“Presidential Amnesty Programme: Successes and Challenges. Lessons Learned for Federal and State Programmes”** was the topic of the 4th Niger Delta Dialogue, held in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State on November 2-3, 2016. The Niger Delta Dialogue is chaired by HRM King Alfred Diète Spiff with the secretariat in the office of Academic Associates PeaceWorks, Warri, Delta State. The ongoing series of dialogues is funded by the European Union, with additional funding for this meeting from the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme.

In addition to regular members of the Niger Delta Dialogue contact group, a large team from the University of Port Harcourt, representatives of the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP),

representatives of amnesty programmes in Bayelsa, Edo, Akwa Ibom, and international observers attended the meeting.

The Bayelsa Dialogue started Day 1 with presentation of researches on the Presidential Amnesty Programme by two groups: the University of Port Harcourt and NEXTIER. A summary on the PAP was presented by Academic Associates PeaceWorks. Following this, Maj Gen Paul Boroh and his team from the Amnesty Office gave their responses to the research reports and shed further light on the challenges and successes of the PAP.

Day 2 started with syndicate groups discussing and reporting back on the following topics: National Amnesty

Programme, State Amnesty Programmes, and Advocacy Points for the Pan Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF). Presentations were given by representatives of the amnesty programmes in Bayelsa, Edo and Imo States.


A formal launch of the book “ Post-Amnesty Conflict Management Framework in the Niger Delta” was conducted by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of PortHarcourt and the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP).

The Dialogue ended with a summary of the successes of the Presidential Amnesty Programme, acknowledgement of the shortcomings of the PAP, and suggestions on how it might be modified for greater effectiveness. It also drew out lessons learned for states attempting to start their own amnesty programmes.

The Niger Delta Dialogue grew out of the region wide Niger Delta Dialogue held in Uyo, Akwa Ibom State on June 10, 2016. At that time it was decided to keep the

dialogue going by holding periodic meetings to discuss evolving issues in the Niger Delta region. Since then Dialogues have been held in Warri, Delta State on July 13-14, in Port Harcourt, Rivers State on September 19-20 and now Yenagoa, Bayelsa State. Topics discussed have included militancy in the region, the Maritime University, evolving conflicts in Urhobo/Isoko/Ndokwa areas, violence in Omoku, the Ogoni clean-up and Bakassi issues.

The Niger Delta Dialogue is evolving into a space where broader issues of the region are discussed in-depth and solutions sought. It brings together a broad group of stakeholders including traditional rulers, concerned professionals, women leaders, youth activists. It currently includes representatives of the six South South States and will bring in representatives from the remaining three Niger Delta States in future programmes. Representatives of the EU delegation and Embassies of the UK, US, Netherlands and France have been observers at all of our meetings.



*Participants at the fourth Niger Delta Dialogue*

## RESEARCH REPORTS

**University of Port Harcourt Report**

**The study on Post-Amnesty Conflict Management Framework in the Niger Delta- by the Faculty of Social Science, University of Port Harcourt, and supported by the DFID funded Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme presented by Prof. Eme N. Ekekwe**

This perception study was carried out in 2014 across six states in the Niger Delta to collate opinions of the people on their expectations of PAP, performance so far, and to provide policy recommendations on how to improve PAP implementation. The research objectives were to:

including faith-based and community groups and state security forces, to sustain peace in post amnesty Niger Delta.

4. Recommend policy options to promote effective monitoring of project beneficiaries, in order to evolve and ultimately strengthen accountability, participation and transparency, and to entrench a process of confidence-building by the citizenry in government

The study covered Key Informant Interviews (KII) with 810 respondents and 18 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) in 18 Local Government Areas



*R-L Dr. Sofiri Joab Peterside; Prof. Okey Onuchukwu (Dean of Social Sciences UNIPORT); Chief (Dr.) Mrs. P.E.B Uku; HRM King Alfred Diete Spiff; Habiba Makanjuola (NSRP); Engr. Ben Donyegha; Prof. Eme N. Ekekwe*

1. Document the nature, type and number of ex-militants trained or empowered to start their own businesses, those already employed and those seeking employment.

2. Identify popular perceptions of the development/empowerment needs of ex-militants as well as the communities, and to determine to what extent the programme was directed to satisfying them.

3. Explore the means, in working with the public and private sectors, civil society groups,

across six States in the Niger Delta – Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Edo, Delta, Ondo and Rivers. The 810 respondents comprised 150 per state, except for Ondo with only 60 respondents.

The summary of the findings of the study are: (as of 2015 when the report was written. Note that attacks on oil facilities in 2016 are not reflected in the research report)

- Implementation of the Presidential Amnesty Programme has restored peace and stabilized security conditions in the once restive region. This relative peace has resulted in increase in oil production (as of 2015) and more

revenue for the Nigerian State. However, the dehumanizing socio- economic conditions that generated militant insurgency subsist. Violence in the Niger Delta is generally on the decline, with few cases of inter-communal conflict, and politically motivated violence especially in Rivers State.

- There is a general loss of confidence in government and the PAP implementing agency. Government alone cannot restore confidence. Lack of ownership, participation of relevant stakeholders in the design and implementation of the Presidential Amnesty Programme and differential access to associated benefits have echoed prominently from the respondents.
- The level of Government's intervention in provision of social services is generally low. The provision of electricity, transport infrastructure such as roads and boats, and social services like potable water and health facilities accounted for the highest level of dissatisfaction.
- A total of 30,000 ex-militants were captured for DDR. Out of this figure, approximately 16,000 have been either trained or are under going training. A major point noted from the report is that it is not enough to train the ex-militants; they desire to be employed or provided business start-up kits and support to be successful in business. Consequently, finding employment opportunities and empowerment for majority of project beneficiaries remain some of the daunting challenges.
- Job creation was not given conscious effort in the implementation of PAP as the people rated it very low in this regard. It came out strongly that community people and ex-militants are not happy with the way and manner the programme was implemented. Consequently, respondents across the six states rated the implementation of the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) low.
- Conflict resolution and peace building efforts of nongovernmental organisations and some development partners are yielding fruits. However, government institutions at all levels

including PAP are weak in conflict resolution and peace building programmes.

The study also identified that Community Elders and Youths, Community Based Organizations (CBOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can be dependable allies in peace building at the community level.

- PAP has not looked beyond its statutory funding from the Federal Government to extend partnership to other agencies and private organisations that are willing to support implementation. The study noted that many agencies and organisations expressed willingness to partner with PAP.

Opportunities for collaboration exist but the collaborative framework for implementation of the Amnesty programme has not been developed and communicated.

- Oil theft and emergence of illegal oil refineries are on the increase in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States though the respondents denied their existence. Makeshift refineries have created environmental and health problems for the people.
- Implementation of the Amnesty programme has been criticized as too focused on the Ijaws- the kinsmen of President Jonathan and Special Adviser to the President on the Niger Delta. Hon. Kingsley Kuku. The Presidential Amnesty programme (PAP) office had disputed this claim by presenting details of beneficiaries showing how broad-based the implementation has been.
- There is a fear of what will happen to those in training in 2015 (when the programme was due to wind up- This obviously did not happen as PAP is still operating in late 2016). PAP plans to hand such beneficiaries over to existing Ministries Departments and Agencies (MDA) which are statutorily empowered by extant laws to oversee scholarships and training programmes for the Federal Government. But the issue of continuation of the monthly stipends of N65,000

from government is yet to be sorted out.

- Poverty reduction in communities affected by militant insurgency or armed related violence seems to be slower than in areas not affected by violence. In some cases, the contrast can be quite stark. Despite the effort of the PAP, the loss of dignity is prevalent among residents of impacted community as individuals and family become dependent on others for survival. Some children forced out of school are unable to return to school and many are not able to get the health care they need and are forced to take up adult responsibilities (this is more apparent in situations of displacement)

Identified Gaps and Limitations in the Report

- The Perception study did not differentiate between the opinions of the militants themselves and those of the community members. For example there is no account of interview with the training beneficiaries and with those yet to benefit.

- Some of the views expressed in the study are beyond the PAP. For example it is not within the mandate of PAP to provide social amenities like healthcare facilities, water, electricity, etc. But the report presented failure in these areas as part of weakness of PAP.

- The study did not present clear picture of how many trained militants are in job placement, either employed or self employed.

- The study did not adequately classify the study populations such as the private companies (oil and gas), community dwellers, government (state and Local Government) and the PAP office, to help in presentation of opinions.

- The study was conducted in 2014 and a lot has changed since then; therefore the perceptions may have changed since then.



L-R Prof. Eme N. Ekeke, Prof. Ijeoma E. Kalu, Prof. Samuel Arokoya, Prof. Okey Onuchuku, H.R.M King Alfred Diете Spiff,

**NEXTIER Report- Transitional Strategy for the Presidential Amnesty Programme**

This desk research report was commissioned by FOSTER and written by NEXTIER, a consultancy group based in Abuja. The report was written in 2015, and thus is not current. It gives an overview of the PAP, its implementation framework, and possible transitional implementation strategies for closing down PAP. The report recommended closure of PAP after fulfilling all reintegration processes.

The major findings of the report include:

- The period for signing up for the amnesty was from June 25, 2009 to October 04, 2009. However, a number of agitators who initially did not trust the commitment of the government to the amnesty programme joined after the deadline.
- A total of 30,000 ex-agitators accepted the amnesty captured in three phases as follows:
  - o Phase 1 (2009): 20,192
  - o Phase 2 (2010): 6,166
  - o Phase 3 (2013): 3,642
- Failure to establish the exact number of agitators in the region. The initial estimate of 15,000 agitators was changed many times over a four-year period to arrive at the final count of 30,000 agitators. The inability to establish the actual number of agitators was understandable as these groups were not regular military units. However it opened up the programme to credibility questions and made initial budgeting and planning difficult. This challenge could have been avoided by an agreement on the specific number of the agitators with the commanders prior to the start of the programme.
- Failure to define and institute clear disarmament criteria. This point is particularly important in the current reality where the programme cannot justify that the quantity and quality of the weapons submitted by the ex-agitators is commensurate with the number of ex-agitators who accepted amnesty.
- Low man-to-weapon ratio under the programme indicates that the various groups may not have submitted considerable quantities of their weapons.
- No evidence of weapon registration for possible tracking of origin to support national security consideration.
- Failure to institute a community-based early warning protocol for renewed arms build-up.
- Command structure still in place: The payment of the TSA through the “Generals” (leaders of the militant groups) goes against the fundamental aim of demobilisation, which is to dismantle the command structure. Rather, it has inadvertently reinforced dependence on the existing line of command within the various militant groups.

- High programme cost: The TSA is typically benchmarked to the prevailing minimum wage in the country and calculated to meet the basket of needs of an average family. The monthly TSA for the Presidential Amnesty Programme is N65,000, which is almost four times the minimum wage in Nigeria (N18,000). Also, the current stipends and allowances for 30,000 ex-agitators represented about 38 percent of the N63.3 billion that was the budget for the Presidential Amnesty Programme in 2014. In the context of the prevailing drop in Nigeria’s national revenue, Presidential Amnesty Programme cannot sustain this cost in the long run.
  - Dependency: Rather than facilitate reintegration, the TSA payments have promoted an unfair sense of entitlement among the ex-agitators.
  - Moral hazard: The high amount and sustained payment of the TSA has created an unintended consequence of potential mimicry by other high-risk populations in other parts of the country.
  - Resource availability: The Presidential Amnesty Programme was well funded given the prevailing economic realities and the need to stabilise security in the Niger Delta. (NB: funding to the PAP dropped considerably in the 2016 budget under a new President) Over US\$1.68 billion was spent on the programme from 2010 to 2014. This amount makes Nigeria’s DDR programmes one of the most expensive in the world.
  - No agreed time duration for earning 65,000 Transitional Safety Net Allowance (TSA) and no plans to wean beneficiaries off of the TSA. Approximately 38-40% of the 2015 PAP budget fund was used for TSA.
- Identified Gaps and Limitations in the Report
- This research is also now out-of-date, so the current number of beneficiaries is not known.

It also is not clear if this is purely a desk research based on Internet and media sources, or if the researchers actually worked with the PAP to obtain the information.



*King Diete Spiff, Chairman of Niger Delta Dialogue and Alexandra Noll of the European Union*

### Informed Review of the Amnesty Programme by AA PeaceWorks


Mr. Sunny Kulutuye, an Abuja-based consultant, was part of the AA PeaceWorks team which worked within the Amnesty Office in January-February 2016. The following challenges facing the programme were identified by him:

1. Amnesty Office lacked data and adequate information on the beneficiaries of the programme. Although as of end of February 2016, it was stated that 17,000 people had been trained, it was not known how many people had been trained in several skills.
2. No thorough assessment of the trained ex-militants was done to ascertain their skill level before they were sent for training. There is also no accurate assessment of their current skill level. For example, someone trained to do underwater welding has a very different skill set than another welder who can only make burglar bars.
3. Lack of transparency and accountability of the programme coupled with government-can-do-it-all syndrome drove away funders that could have aided the success of the programme.

4. The PAP lacked a strategic action plan for the implementation of the programme. Most local and international donors are reluctant to contribute if there is no strategic plan for the agency.

### Following from these challenges, the reviewer recommended that:

1. An objective research-based analysis of the beneficiaries of the programme be carried out.
2. There should also be opportunity mapping of available jobs. This should inform the kind of training that will be given to the remaining ex-militants so that the problem of lack of job placement after training will be addressed.
3. There is a need for mindset change through reorientation, prior to job placement.
4. Job placement should be strongly emphasized to take beneficiaries out of the programme and into the real world.
5. There is a need to design actionable strategic plan for the implementation of the programme.



*L-R Utavie , Ogochuku, Emobor & Christy, members of the Secretariat Team*

## RESPONSES TO THE RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS BY THE AMNESTY TEAM



Standing L-R Prof. Okey Onuchukwu & Brig. Gen. P.T. Boroh Presidential Adviser on Niger Delta / Head of Amnesty Programme

The Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta and Coordinator, Presidential Amnesty Programme- Brig. Gen. Paul Boroh expressed his happiness at being in the meeting. He pointed out that the amnesty programme is a security stabilization programme put in place by the Federal Government of Nigeria to stem the tide of militancy in 2009 and that the programme is still performing the duty for which it was established till date. He noted that since appointed in the last one year, he had been working tirelessly to make sure that the Amnesty Programme is a success. Brig. Gen. Boroh observed that the information presented in the research is outdated because it was conducted in 2014 while he resumed office in 2015. In that interval a lot has happened that was not captured in the research. He also observed that the research team left out interviewing the Amnesty Office during the fieldwork, thus making the research one-sided and biased. With regards to the unemployment challenge identified in the policy brief, Brig. Gen. Boroh argued that the duty of the amnesty office is to disarm, train and reintegrate ex-militants and not to get the ex-militants jobs. According to him, unemployment is a global and national challenge. It is not limited to the Niger Delta or the disarmed ex-militants. He briefed the gathering that his office is working earnestly and engaging its partners to end the stipend regime and transit the programme to a new phase. The office has also established skills acquisition centres in the region where ex-militants will be trained in various vocational skills to fast-track the process of the reintegration programme of the office. He urged the researchers to always visit the Amnesty Office whenever they are doing research relating to the programme.


Mr Beggi Erepatei and Mr. Tam Mologe from the Amnesty Office raised issues with some aspects of the study. Mr Mologe clarified that the Amnesty Programme has a mandate that does not encompass accommodation of more ex-militants into the scheme, other than the 30,000 that have been documented. He added further that it is incorrect to say that most of the ex-militants have not found gainful jobs because the Office has robust data of ex-militants that have been gainfully employed, even in federal civil service agencies and other places across the country. He equally pointed out that the Amnesty Programme is an interventionist programme necessitated by political imperatives and failure of government institutional

agencies to do their job. Blaming the programme for resumption of instability in the Niger Delta, in his words, is like “blaming the baby for the failure of the grandparents”. MrBeggi’s clarified that during the Obrubra camp, the ex-militants were given days to think through what they would prefer to be trained on. What they chose informed the training they were given. Major Bernard also clarified that the Amnesty Office has compiled a thorough biometric database of Rivers State beneficiaries and is ready to complete the databases for the other states, as soon as funds are available.

Issues raised by the Amnesty team are summarized below:

- 1.Methodological Challenges
- 2.The research is outdated. It was conducted in 2014 meanwhile a lot has changed since then to now, thus prompting updating.
- 3.The research is one-sided as only “obscure” people whose identities were unknown were interviewed while representatives of government agency in charge of the programme- Amnesty Office- were left out of the interview.
- 4.Some of the findings of the study were considered false because they do not correspond to fact. For instance statement as “the training of ex-militants did not follow from the need of the ex-militants but was imposed on them” was criticised by the representatives of the Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta Affairs.

Habiba Makanjuola, the research manager of the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), also added her voice to the various responses to the brief. She pointed out that the outcomes of the research which revealed what the people want the programme to address, as contrasted with the limited mandate given to the programme as argued by Mr.Mologe, showed a large communication gap between the people at the grassroots and the policy-makers at the helm of affairs. She therefore noted that the research can instigate the process of policy change that will address the expectations of the grassroots people and put the people and policy makers on the same page. She advised that the research should actually prompt researchers and policy implementors into considering how to address the communication lacuna and make the Amnesty Programme work for the Niger Delta people.



Tamarabebe Freeman Mologe  
Amnesty Office

## SYNDICATE SESSION

Three syndicate groups critically examined the various amnesty programmes currently going on the Niger Delta region and develop advocacy points for the government. The first group reviewed the national amnesty programme. The second group reviewed the state amnesty programmes while the third group developed critically relevant advocacy points on the amnesty programme for Pan Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF).



*Syndicate Group 1, Facilitated by Mr. Sunny Kulutuye*

### Group One- National Amnesty Programme Group

Facilitator – Sunny Kulutuye

This group reviewed the implementation of the Presidential Amnesty Programme including the successes and challenges of the programme, as well as recommendations on how the programme can be repositioned for the stabilization of the Niger Delta. The following recommendations were made by the members of the group:

1. Effective funding of the Presidential Amnesty Programme.
2. Facilitate the passage of the Amnesty bill to provide a legal framework for the Amnesty Programme. This should provide avenues for the inclusion of those previously excluded from the Amnesty Programme and widen its scope.
3. States and Local Governments should participate in the process of reintegrating the Amnesty beneficiaries by providing

employment opportunities and creating conducive environment for enterprises to spring up.

4. Seriously impacted States should pursue the request for further amnesty, if need be, from the federal government directly.

### Group Two- State Amnesty Programmes

Facilitator- Dr. Felix Tuodolo

This group critically examined and analysed amnesty programmes implemented by the States in the Niger Delta region. The group observed that only Bayelsa, Rivers and Imo States are currently implementing Amnesty programmes at the state level. These programmes focused more on addressing criminality, especially gangsterism and cultism. The following were identified as the challenges of the State amnesties especially those of Rivers, Bayelsa and Imo States:



*Syndicate Group 2, Facilitated by Dr. Felix Tuodolo*

1. Lack of consistency in the implementation of the programme. The implementation is largely ad-hoc and not vigorously sustained.
2. The State Amnesty Programmes lack adequate funding and implementation.
3. No links or relationships exist between Federal Government sponsored amnesty programme and those of the States.

### The group recommended:

1. Framework of collaboration between the Presidential Amnesty Programme and that of

the State Government should be developed.

2. State programmes on Amnesty should be properly planned and implemented in collaboration with the Presidential Amnesty Programme and other key actors.
3. The Presidential Amnesty Programme should establish liaison offices in the states for monitoring and follow-up of trainees/beneficiaries.
4. State governments should provide opportunities for engaging trained amnesty beneficiaries through entrepreneurship and employment.
5. Multinational oil companies should support efforts at the state level through funding and training
6. Pipelines protection should be given to communities.
7. State governments in the Niger Delta should come up with specific programmes targeting non-militants/agitators.
8. Communities should support the Presidential Amnesty Programme and state programmes through re-orientation.
9. Communities should feel the impact of the 13% derivation through the provision of critical infrastructure and service.
10. States and local governments in the Niger Delta should exhibit good governance for the development of the region.

### **Group Three- Advocacy Point for the Pan Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF)**

Facilitator- Uche Ifukor

This group was asked to develop advocacy points for PANDEF especially with regards to the amnesty programme. From the review of the point on the Amnesty Programme as contained in the 16 – Point Dialogue issues presented to Mr. President by PANDEF on November 1, 2016, the syndicate group identified two key issues. Firstly, the Presidential Amnesty Programme lacks a genuine exit strategy framework. Second issue - how to transit the programme from stipend regime to making beneficiaries employable/self-reliant through acquisition

of appropriate skills. The group suggested 10 advocacy points for PANDEF with regards to the result-oriented implementation of the Amnesty Programme. These action points are as follows:

1. Need for the programme to include the ex-militants who have been documented but are yet to be included in the programme.
2. Need for synergy between the Federal Government Amnesty Programme and the emerging amnesty initiatives at the State level.
3. Starter-packs should be provided for ex-militants who are genuinely willing to start-up businesses as entrepreneurs.
4. All interventionist agencies in the Niger Delta region should be brought together to work with the Presidential Amnesty Programme. This will enable the programme carry out its other functions beyond disarmament.
5. The Amnesty office should create liaison offices in all the Niger Delta States.
6. The programme should have proper media and communication strategy.
7. The programme should be devoid of party politics.
8. All agencies working for infrastructural development of the Niger Delta region must be strengthened through adequate funding.
9. The clean-up and environmental remediation of the Niger Delta region should be extended beyond Ogoniland to other affected areas in the Region.
10. The Niger Delta Amnesty Programme must be adequately funded for effective performance.



*Syndicate Group 3, Facilitated by Mr. Uche Ifukor*

## PRESENTATIONS ON EFFORTS OF BAYELSA, EDO, AKWA-IBOM STATE GOVERNMENTS IN REINTEGRATION OF EX-MILITANTS

Representatives of several states undertaking their own amnesty programmes spoke on the challenges and successes of the effort. “General” Africa Ukparasia and Joshua Maciver spoke on Bayelsa State’s efforts to deal with issues of cultism and militancy. “General” Africa Ukparasia, a former militant leader and current chairman of the Bayelsa State Waterways Security Committee, linked the resumption of militancy in the Niger Delta to the failure of government to make good its promises which led into voluntarily accepting the amnesty in 2009. He urged the federal government to implement the 16-point agenda submitted by PANDEF because it holds the key to the resolution of renewed insurgency in the Niger Delta region. Another former militant leader and now chairman of Southern Ijaw Local Government, Hon. Joshua Maciver pointed out that those boys that were ‘demobilised’ from his armed group during the Amnesty Programme still come to him today for financial assistance because they cannot find means of survival even when they have been trained in various vocations. He equally pointed out that oil companies are also making the matter worse by not employing from among the Niger Delta youths, especially those who have been trained by the Amnesty Office. The focus of the Bayelsa State amnesty programme is mainly on cultists.

The representative from Edo State, Robert EkemeFiyes, pointed at exclusion of a number of Edo State youth from the Amnesty Programme since inception. A number of their youth have not yet been trained. The focus has been on Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta States, with little attention given to Edo State. A former agitator from Edo, Engr. Donyegha Ben stated that during the amnesty programme he played a major role in the disarmament, convincing many of his boys to disarm. However to date they have not been trained or engaged. Don-Ben lamented that the report of the Technical Committee, of which he was a part, has not yet been implemented. He also hopes that the recent meeting with President Buhari will yield tangible results.

Michael Ekpo of Akwalbom State also commented that youth from his region were not carried along in the Amnesty Programme. He also commented that the Federal Government is not concerned with the problems of Bakassi.

Representatives of Rivers State were not present as they were conducting their own disarmament exercise at the time of the meeting. The representative of Imo State, Aguocha Clinton, unfortunately arrived after the meeting had closed. However, media reports have covered the initiation of the Imo State Amnesty Programme.




L-R Dr Felix Tuodolo 1st Ijaw Youth Council President, Robert Ekeme Fiyes Edo State, King Alfred Diete Spiff Chairman of Niger Delta Dialogue, Africa Akparasia Chairman Bayelsa State Water Ways Security, Amb. Dr B. Igali Facilitator, Hon. Joshua Maciver Chairman of Southern Ijaw LG, Engr. Don Ben Donyegha -Edo

## SUCCESSSES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTY PROGRAMME

At the end of the various discussions, the following were noted:

- The PAP achieved its immediate expected result of creating peace in 2009 but a strategy for maintaining the peace was not articulated from the beginning. In the past one year, there have been a series of politically motivated attacks in the riverine areas. There have also been attacks in the upland areas in protest against Urhobo, Isoko, Ndokwa, etc. youth not being included in the original amnesty programme. Unfortunately no structure was put in place in 2009 for detecting and responding to new forms of unrest.
- The PAP was charged with the mandate of DDR but implementation of Disarmament was solely the responsibility of the Military led by the Office of the National Security Adviser to the President.
- A total of 30,000 ex-agitators (militants) were captured in three phases of disarmament. Most of the present agitators are not part of the people captured.
- Poor records were kept of both agitators and weapons collected.
- A total of 15,212 have been trained, 3,377 have on-going training and 11,411 are yet to be trained.
- Only 3,500 (23%) out of the trained number (15,212) are empowered (given job placement either as employee or self employed). Therefore 77% of the



trained ex-agitators are without jobs.

- Amongst the 15,212 trained, some trainees attended more than one training. Initially accurate records were not kept, so the actual number of trained persons cannot be ascertained. Also, the selection process was not transparent enough to identify double entry.
- Training has not seriously impacted on the lives of the people except some of those given formal education here in Nigeria and abroad. Many trainees sell their starter packs and go back to wandering the streets.
- Effective business training was seldom given to beneficiaries so if they could not find appropriate employment, their newly acquired skills often went to waste.
- Adequate opportunity mapping was also not conducted to identify needs of industries and businesses in the Niger Delta. Thus many trainees did



Mr Richard Young of the EU Delegation

not have relevant employment opportunities for their skills.

- At various times the monthly stipends have been paid through group leaders. Rather than demobilizing the groups, this has reinforced the group hierarchy and given group leaders the opportunity to take a cut of their group members' stipends.
- There has been no strategy of how to wean beneficiaries off the monthly stipends and into a world of employment or self-employment.
- Participants in the PAP were asked what kind of training they would like to receive. However little aptitude testing was conducted to determine if these were realistic choices.
- Although administration of the PAP has improved under the current head, it got off to a shaky start with no accurate database of the militant groups, nontransparent inclusion of beneficiaries, lack of thorough opportunity mapping, only brief counseling of agitators on choice of training, inadequate mindset change orientation, and job placement efforts that came years late.

These are all lessons learned from the PAP that started in 2009 for modification of the current Presidential programme and initiation of state level amnesty programmes.

**OUR RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. There is the need to institute a biometric system for keeping and tracking records of beneficiaries. This will aid in checking double entry during training as well.
2. As part of repositioning the PAP for success, there is the need to prepare a strategic plan that can

be shared with other Nigerian government MDAs, oil companies, and international donors to get their buy-in and make financial and technical contributions. A good strategic plan will be used as advocacy and marketing tool for reaching out to other interest groups and partners.

3. It is necessary to carry out opportunity mapping of potential sources of employment and self-employment in the Niger Delta region. This will help in providing guidance and support to beneficiaries of the PAP.
4. There is the need to create a mindset change and skills identifications programme within the PAP implementation process. Not all beneficiaries will require formal training. Some have skills that need to be activated or developed and put to use immediately. Skills training/educational training alone cannot stop a youth from being violent. Therefore mindset change and reorientation is required.
5. As already noted only about 23% of the trained youths have accessed jobs. Therefore, adequate attention should be given to job placement. This should form part of the plan for moving participants from receiving the TSA of N65,000 per month. Based on the analysis of skills sets and the Opportunity Mapping, beneficiaries can be categorized into 3 groupings: (business cluster category, employment category and self-employment category). A job placement unit should be created with a coordinator to oversee the activities.

6. There is the need to create programmes that will focus on nonviolent youths within the region. This will help to create a system of reward for nonviolent behaviour. It will include awareness and sensitization programmes for youths in schools.



L-R Richard Young - EU, Chief Dr. Mrs PEB Uku - Olu's Palace, Chief Dr. Judith Burdin Asuni - Facilitator, H.R.M King Alfred Diete Spiff - Chair NDD, Amb Hon Nkoyo Toyo - Facilitator, Habiba Makanjuola - NSRP, Dr. Ukiwe Ukoha - NSRP, Alexandra Noll - EU

## ATTENDANCE LIST

S/N	Name	Address	Organisation
1	H.E King Alfred Diете Spiff	Port Harcourt	Traditional ruler
2	Hon. Donyegha Ben	Benin	Activist
3	Mr. Sunny Kulutuye	Abuja	Besot Dev. Consult Services
4	Pst. P.Z. Aginighan	Port Harcourt	Opinion Leader
5	Chief (Dr) Mrs P.E.B Uku	Benin	Olu of Warri Palace
6	Hon. Morris Idiovwa	Warri	Chairman OML 30 CDB
7	H.H Sara -Igbe	Warri	Activist
8	Livingstone Membere	Port Harcourt	Kalabari Youth Federation
9	Chief Dr Obiuwevbi Ominimini	AgbharaOtor	OPAAN Urhobo
10	Chief Gbenekama Godspower	Gbaramatu	Ijaw Nation
11	Chief Esin Ani. E	Calabar	Opinion Leader
12	Mr. Michael U.Ekpo	Lagos	Opinion Leader
13	Dr. Felix Tuodolo	Bayelsa	Former IYC President
14	Enilkoma Martins	Bayelsa	Stakeholder
15	Agbenke B. John	Yenagoa	Ijaw Youth Council
16	Hon. Fakidouma. O	Bayelsa	
17	Kosipre Charles	Yenagoa	
18	Chief Lawal Africas	Port Harcourt	PIND -Partners for Peace
19	Prof Steve Azaiki	Yenagoa	
20	Amb. Dr Godknows B. Igali	Abuja	Facilitator
21	Amb. Nkoyo Toyo	Abuja	Facilitator
22	Chief (Dr) Judith Burdin Asuni	Warri	Facilitator, AAPeaceWorks
23	Brig. Gen P.T Boroh	Abuja	Presidential Adviser on Niger Delta/ Head Amnesty Programme
24	LT. Col. Okungbure	Abuja	Amnesty Office
25	Maj. Matti Abdul	Abuja	Amnesty Office
26	Tamarabebe Freeman Mologe	OSAPND	Amnesty Office
27	Maj. Bernard Ochoche	OSAPND	Amnesty Office
28	Beggi Erepatei	OSAPND	Amnesty Office
29	Esther Adaka Boro	OSAPND	Amnesty Office
30	Sophia Egran. B	Govt House	Bayelsa
31	Gen. Imonotimi Africanus .I.	Bayelsa	Water Ways Security Bayelsa State
32	Hon. Aguocha Clinton	Imo	NDYM, Govt. House Imo State
33	Robert Ekeme Fiyes	Edo	Govt. House Edo State
34	Donald Wokoma	Abuja	V.P's Office
35	Hon. Joshua Maciver	Bayelsa	Southern Ijaw Local Government

## ATTENDANCE LIST

36	Prof. Okey Onuchuku	UNIPORT	Researcher
37	Dr. Sofiri Joab Peterside	UNIPORT	Researcher
38	Npinimaa Nkoowin	UNIPORT	Researcher
39	Idu .V. Emmanuel	UNIPORT	Researcher
40	Okoro Alex Omojo	UNIPORT	Researcher
41	James O'Neal	UNIPORT	Researcher
42	Prof. Eme Ekekwe	UNIPORT	Researcher
43	Dr. Emma Wonah	UNIPORT	Researcher
44	C.N Nwakamma	UNIPORT	Researcher
45	Prof. Ijeoma E. Kalu	UNIPORT	Researcher
46	Dr(Mrs) C.N. Nnaburo	UNIPORT	Researcher
47	Emmanuel Nwakanma	UNIPORT	Researcher
48	Dr. Paul Nyulaku	UNIPORT	Researcher
49	Prof. Samuel Arokoya	UNIPORT	Researcher
50	Alexandra Nolls	Abuja	European Union Delegation
51	Bertrand De Sessan De Manignan	Abuja	France
52	Maria Davydenko	Lagos	US Consul Lagos
53	Angelique Vander Made	Abuja	Netherlands Embassy
54	Richard Young	Abuja	European Union Delegation
55	Fidelia Onoghaye	Abuja	Netherlands Embassy
56	Ukoha Ukiwo	Abuja	British Council NSRP
57	Habiba Makanjuola	Abuja	British Council NSRP
58	Hope Alubeze	Abuja	NSRP
59	Kosipre Charles	Yenagoa	AIT
60	Tekena Amieyeofori	Port Harcourt	AIT
61	Doubra Tina - Wood	Bayelsa	Channels TV
62	Daniel Solomon		Silverbird TV
63	Pedro Innocent		Channels TV
64	Stephen Momoh		TVC News
65	Ajaere O. Benjamin	Port Harcourt	TVC News
66	Edmond Awadje	Port Harcourt	TVC News
67	Ogochuku Okekpolo	Warri	AA PeaceWorks
68	Christiana I tiveh	Warri	AA PeaceWorks
69	Stephen Iyama	Warri	AA PeaceWorks
70	Stanley Worahu	Warri	AA PeaceWorks
71	Ebivwe Emuobo	Warri	AA PeaceWorks
72	Ken Omavuyenor	Warri	AA PeaceWorks
73	Uche Ifukor	Warri	AA PeaceWorks



# Niger Delta Dialogue

*A World of Peace*

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